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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
It is the thesis of this memorandum that the problem of tactics and 
strategy for advancement of the libertarian-individualist cause is at a critical 
crossroads,  a  crossroads  in  the  historical  development  of  this  stream  of 
thought, transcending even the important problems of establishing a possible 
libertarian institute, or of deciding how to rechannel educational funds from 
various blind alleys into which they have fallen. Many of us have devoted a 
great deal of time to advancing and developing libertarian and individualist 
thought itself, into rendering it consistent, deepening and rediscovering its 
implications, etc. But none of us has devoted time to thinking about a theory 
of  strategy  and  tactics  for  advancing  the  cause  of  this  doctrine,  and  it  is 
therefore to this end that this paper is modestly offered. We need more than 
any  other  single  thing  a  fruitful  dialogue  and  research  into  this  whole 
problem.  This  is  not  to  say,  of  course,  that  a  development  of  libertarian 
thought itself should be neglected.  
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Toward A Theory of Revolutionary Strategy 
I am here using the shock term “revolution” not in the sense of violent, 
or even nonviolent revolution against the State. I mean by “revolution” the 
effecting of an ideological revolution in the framework of ideas held by the 
bulk of our fellow men. We are, in this sense, revolutionaries—for we are 
offering  the  public  a  radical  change  in  their  doctrinal  views  and  we  are 
offering it from a firm and consistent base of principle that we are trying to 
spread among the public. (Largely, this comprehensive system is “libertarian,” 
i.e., the pure libertarian system, or, as a step to that, the laissez-faire system. 
But it also encompasses other aspects of “individualist” thought. An example 
is the good work that Volker and its Council of Basic Education have been 
doing against progressive education. As libertarians solely, we have no quarrel 
with  progressive  education,  privately  offered.  But  as  individualists  and 
rationalists, as people who want to see individual intellectual excellence and 
moral  principles  fostered  in  society,  we  favor  intellectual,  as  opposed  to 
“progressive,” education.) 
Here  we  stand,  then,  a  “hard  core”  of  libertarian-individualist 
“revolutionaries,” anxious not only to develop our own understanding of this 
wonderful system of thought, but also anxious to spread its principles—and 
its policies—to the rest of society. How do we go about it? 
I  think  that  here  we  can  learn  a  great  deal  from  Lenin  and  the 
Leninists—not  too  much,  of  course,  because  the  Leninist  goals  are  the 
opposite of ours—but particularly the idea that the Leninist party is the main, 
or indeed only, moral principle. We are not interested in seizing power and 
governing  the  State,  and  we  therefore  proclaim,  not  only  adhere  to,  such 
values as truth, individual happiness, etc., which the Leninists subordinate to 
their party’s victory.  
But from one aspect of Lenin’s theory of strategy we can learn much: 
the setting forth of what “revolutionaries” can do to advance their principles, 
as opposed to the contrasting “deviations from the correct line,” which the 
Leninists have called “left-wing sectarianism” and “right-wing opportunism.” 
(In  our  case,  the  terminology  would  be  reversed,  perhaps:  “left-wing 
opportunism” and “right-wing sectarianism.”)  
The sectarian strategists (e.g., the current Trotskyite sects) are those 
who pass out leaflets on street corners, state their full ideological position at 
all  times,  and  consider  any  collaboration  in  halfway  measures  as 
“opportunist,” “selling out the cause,” etc. They are undoubtedly noble, but 
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The  opposite  “deviation”  is  “opportunism”:  the  willingness  to 
collaborate  with  any  halfway  measures  or  organizations,  and,  in  effect,  to 
abandon  the  true  principles  in  the  name  of  gradualist  advance, “realism,” 
“practical life,” etc. These are the real sellers-out of the revolution, and they 
almost always, in historical Leninist experience, end by turning “reformist” 
and  abandoning—in  fact  and  later  even  de  jure—their  revolutionary 
principles. These people are ignoble, and, if they are at all effective, they are 
not effective in the proper, revolutionary direction. 
On  the  “Right,”  we  have  had  plenty  of  experience  with  the 
opportunists. If we were forced to choose, surely self-respect would demand 
the “sectarian” course; the “opportunist” is, by his nature, “liquidationist” of 
true principle. But I believe that there is a third, “centrist” course—certainly 
hard to find in practice, but the broad outlines of which can be sketched, and 
then perhaps used as a guide for our future activities. This “middle way” 
(Ugh! How I hate that concept!) may, for convenience, be dubbed “centrist” 
or “Leninist,” and it runs, I believe, roughly as follows: 
Our  objective  is,  of  course,  to  advance  our  principles—to  spread 
libertarian-individualist thought (from now on to be called “libertarian” for 
short) among the people and to spread its policies in the political arena. This 
is our objective, which must never be lost sight of. We must, then, always aim 
toward  the  advancement  of  libertarian  thought,  both  in  its  creative 
development,  and  its  spread  among  the  intellectuals  and  eventually  the 
“masses.” This is the ultimate essence of our aim, this advancement of the 
“hard  core”  of  libertarian  thought  and  libertarian  thinkers.  The  group  of 
totally libertarian thinkers is, in short, the “hard core” or the “cadre” of the 
broadly libertarian or quasi-libertarian movement. 
Second, bearing this objective in mind, we should work on the “lower 
levels”  of  thought  and  action  toward  a  “Fabian”  advance  of  libertarian 
objectives. In this way, the hardcore man, the “militant” libertarian, works to 
advance not only the total system, but all steps toward that system. In this way, 
we  achieve  “unity  of  theory  and  practice,”  we  spurn  the  pitfalls  of  base 
opportunism, while making ourselves much more effective than our brothers, 
the sectarians. 
Let us turn to a hypothetical example (purely hypothetical). Suppose 
one or two hardcore libertarians join some Organization for Repeal of the 
Income  Tax.  In  working  for  ORFIT,  what  does  the  hardcore  libertarian 
accomplish?  
(1)  In  the  very  act  of  agitating  for  repeal  of  the  income  tax,  he  is 
pushing people in the direction of repeal and perhaps eventually bringing 
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short, he is advancing the cause of libertarianism in the very act of advancing 
the cause of income tax repeal. Thus, everything he does for ORFIT, being 
consistent with the ultimate libertarian objective helps advance that objective, 
and does not betray it.  
(2)  In  the  course  of  this  work,  the  hardcore  libertarian  should  try  to 
advance the knowledge of both the masses and his fellow ORFIT members, 
toward fuller libertarian ideals. In short, to “push” his colleagues and others 
toward the direction of hardcore libertarian thought itself. (In Communist-
Leninist terms, this is called “recruiting for the Party,” or pushing colleagues 
at least some way along this road.) The hardcore man is working for his idea 
on two levels: in a “popular” or “united” front for limited libertarian goals, 
and to try to influence his colleagues as well as the masses in the direction of 
the total system. (This is the essence of the much-misunderstood Leninist 
theory of “infiltration.”) 
The effective centrist avoids the pitfalls of “opportunism” by keeping 
the objective firmly in view, and, in particular, by never acting in a manner, or 
speaking in a manner, inconsistent with the full libertarian position. To be inconsistent, 
in the name of “practicality” is to betray the libertarian position itself, and is 
worthy of the utmost condemnation. (I would say here, by the way, that I 
think that Baldy Harper has been remarkable in hewing to this “strategy” of 
consistency with libertarianism in all of his writings.)  
In the name of practicality, the opportunist not only loses any chance 
of advancing others toward the ultimate goal, but he himself gradually loses 
sight of that goal—as happens with any “sellout” of principle. Thus, suppose 
that one is writing about taxation. It is not incumbent on the libertarian to 
always proclaim his full “anarchist” position in whatever he writes; but it is 
incumbent upon him in no way to praise taxation or condone it; he should 
simply leave this perhaps glaring vacuum, and wait for the eager reader to 
begin to question and perhaps come to you for further enlightenment. But if 
the libertarian says, “Of course, some taxes must be levied,” or something of 
the sort, he has betrayed the cause. 
Examples of “opportunist liquidationists” recently: the host of so-called 
“anarchists” who went around telling all their friends that good old Dick 
Nixon is “really a libertarian”; or, in the same campaign, Prof. William H. 
Peterson’s revolting letter to the New York Times contra Galbraith, in which he 
said that, of course, there must be some “public sector,” but that this must be 
“balanced.” (Presumably, Galbraith’s suggested size of the public sector was 
not “balanced”? And just what is your criterion for balance, Mr. Peterson?) 
(This does not mean that I believe any support for Nixon or Kennedy was 
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a pretty good libertarian”—that I am talking about. I do think, however, that 
most of the libertarians for Nixon were being, in effect, liquidationist in their 
outlook.) 
As an example of a sectarian approach, I would cite the strategic view 
of Mr. Leonard Read, who believes that all one need do is to stay away from 
specifics, keep repeating over and over that liberty is a good thing and the 
number of ingredients that the free market puts into a pencil, keep advancing 
yourself,  and  the  world  will  beat  a  path  to  your  door.  Setting  aside  the 
problem of specifics and generalities, I think that this view of strategy—only 
self-improving, never trying to influence others—is nonsensical, that it will 
get nowhere, particularly get nowhere in diffusing the influence of the hard 
core. For one of the reasons behind the idea of “infiltration” is that we can 
probably never hope to have everyone a hardcore man, just as we can never 
hope  to  have  everyone  an  intellectual.  Since  the  hard  core  will  always  be 
relatively  small,  its  influence  must  be  maximized  by  giving  it  “leverage” 
through allied, less libertarian “united fronts” with less libertarian thinkers 
and doers. 
To restate my view of the proper strategy: we must, first and foremost, 
nourish and increase the hard core; we must, then, try to diffuse and advance 
principles and action as far as possible in the direction of hardcore doctrines. To 
abandon  the  hard  core  is  liquidationist;  to  abandon  all  hardcore  leverage 
upon others is to remain sterile and ineffective. We must combine the two 
elements; we must, in short, nourish and develop a hard core, which will then 
permeate and exert leverage upon others. 
As I will make clearer later on, I think the outstanding weakness of the 
programs of Volker-Earhart in recent years—which have been magnificent in 
their  impact—and  the  weakness  of  Mr.  Kenneth  Templeton’s  theory  of 
“infiltration” is that, while a broad base of “right-wing” intellectuals has been 
developed and nourished, it has been done to the neglect of the vital task of 
building  up  the  hard  core.  There  can  be  no  successful  “infiltration”  or 
“permeation,” unless there is a flourishing hardcore nucleus that does the 
infiltrating. But more on this anon. 
To answer the vital question, what is to be done? it is necessary (1) to 
set forth the theoretical framework for a theory of libertarian strategy; and (2) 
to engage in a brief historical analysis of the data of the current case—to see 
where we are and how we have gotten that way. Having treated the first 
problem, let us now turn to a historical analysis of the libertarian movement 
in the United States since World War II. 
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From the Depths: World War II and After 
Certainly,  the  period  of  World  War  II  was  the  nadir  of  libertarian 
thought  in  America.  (One  of  the  reasons  why  I  am  personally  optimistic 
about libertarianism is that I became a libertarian during this absolute trough 
period.) Anyone with libertarian inclinations felt himself completely isolated 
and alone; he believed that he was the only one remotely of such views. This 
period was preeminently the period of isolation for the libertarian. I was one of 
two students on the entire Columbia campus “to the right” of Harry Truman, 
and  others  of  my  generation  felt  the  same  way.  There  was,  in  short,  no 
movement; there was, in particular, no open center for a libertarian to go to, 
to “enter the movement,” to find congenial and like-minded thinkers, etc. 
(I  am  going  to  stress,  again  and  again  through  this  memo,  the 
importance of an “open center” for hardcore men. For one way to develop a 
hardcore man, is gradually —through, in my hypothetical example, working 
in ORFIT, then gradually being moved to a more “advanced” position. But 
another and important way is an open center where someone who is already a 
hardcore or near-hardcore man, can find his way and enter. This is one of the 
functions  of  an  open  center—and  one  of  the  reasons,  again,  why  the 
Communist  Party  always  wants  to  maintain  an  “open  Party”  as  well  as 
infiltrating groups, etc.) 
So the dominant fact of this era was isolation for the libertarian. Here 
and there, in the catacombs, unbeknownst to us struggling neophytes, were 
little,  separated  groups  of  people:  In  Los  Angeles,  Leonard  Read,  Orval 
Watts,  and  R.C.  Hoiles  began  to  move  toward  a  libertarian  (or  quasi-
libertarian) position in the L.A. Chamber of Commerce, reprinting Bastiat, 
establishing Pamphleteers, Inc. At Cornell Agriculture School, F.A. Harper 
and  several  students  of  his  were  developing  a  libertarian  view.  Albert  Jay 
Nock and a few right-wing Georgist disciples advanced their theory, Nock 
publishing Memoirs of a Superfluous Man, Frank Chodorov, having been fired as 
director  of  the  Henry  George  School,  establishing  his  superb  “little 
magazine,” analysis. Nock gained a post as book reviewer for the National 
Economic Council, and was succeeded by another independent and isolated 
libertarian thinker, Rose Wilder Lane. Garet Garrett, having been ousted in 
the  left-wing  palace  revolution  at  the  Saturday  Evening  Post,  established  a 
quarterly American Affairs at the National Industrial Conference Board, under 
the  benign  eye  of  Dr.  Virgil  Jordan.  Isabel  Paterson,  brilliant  and 
cantankerous, resigned from her column at the Herald-Tribune to publish her 
great work, God of the Machine.  
These,  in  the  World  War  II  years,  were  the  tiny,  isolated  currents 
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era: “In the Depths.” (I should add that Ludwig von Mises, unhonored and 
unsung, was eking out a pittance at the NYU School of Business.) There 
were,  of  course,  older  mass-influencing  publications  with  generally  “right-
wing” views (much more so than today): the Hearst Press, the NAM, etc., but 
these could hardly function as leaders of thought or as bases for growth of a 
movement. And they were hardly libertarian. 
Phase II: The Founding of FEE 
With  the  formation  of  the  Foundation  for  Economic  Education  in 
1946,  the  libertarian  movement  turned  a  corner  and  began  its  postwar 
renaissance. FEE can be attacked on many, many counts—and I have done 
my share—but one achievement it can be proud of: it gathered together the 
many isolated and loose strands of the libertarians, and created that crucial 
open  center  for  a  libertarian  movement.  It  not  only  disseminated  libertarian 
literature; it provided a gateway, a welcoming place, for all hitherto isolated 
and neophyte libertarians. It launched the movement.  
This  great  feat  of  FEE  in  launching  the  libertarian  movement  is 
testimony  to  the  enormous  need  for  a  functioning  “open  center”  for 
libertarians. For not only did this open center provide a channel and gateway 
for people to enter the libertarian ranks; not only did its agitation convert 
some and find others; it also, by providing an atmosphere and a “center” for 
like-minded  students  of  liberty,  provided  the  atmospheric  spark  for  rapid 
advance from old-fashioned laissez-faire to 100% liberty on the part of much 
of  its  staff  and  friends.  In  short,  FEE,  by  its  very  existence,  exerted  an 
enormous multiple leverage in creating and advancing and weaving together 
the strands and people in the libertarian cause. For this may it always be 
honored! 
Leonard Read it was, of course, who performed this feat, and he drew 
together at or near FEE the various strands of the movement: Harper and his 
students  from  Cornell;  the  Los  Angeles  group;  Herb  Cornuelle,  who  had 
been  converted  to  liberty  by  the  almost  legendary  unknown  figure  “Red 
Miller”  of  a  Detroit  municipal  government  service;  Frank  Chodorov,  etc. 
And FEE, from the very beginning, devoted itself to the task not only of 
spreading  its  ideas,  but  also  of  finding  and  developing  hardcore  (at  least 
hardcore  according  to  its  lights)  libertarians.  I  believe  it  safe  to  say  that 
virtually every libertarian in the country found his way into the ranks through 
FEE, and that almost every leading libertarian was, at one time or another, 
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The Decline of FEE 
Yet, with its achievement recorded, FEE must be set down as a tragic 
failure when we consider what it could have accomplished. It could have been a 
great center for libertarian thought; its members had the potential. But this 
potential was crippled—largely by the limitations, intellectual and otherwise, 
of Leonard Read. Read, in the last analysis, molded FEE in his own image, 
which is not writ very large.  
Hardly appreciative of scholarship or of the conditions of free inquiry 
and research, Read stifled the scholarly and creative productivity of everyone 
on his staff—to the extent that all of the capable people, one after another, 
were  forced  to  leave.  FEE  publications  were  increasingly  pitched  toward 
housewives,  rather  than  scholars,  which  immediately  tossed  away  the 
importance  of  the  “pyramid  of  influence”  from  intellectual  to  mass.  The 
advance of purer libertarian thought was not only discouraged by Read but 
bitterly attacked.  
But  housewives,  in  their  turn,  are  not  very  interested  in  the 
construction of a pencil or the tale of a shirt; they are rather interested in 
specifics in evaluating Barry Goldwater or the problem of federal aid. The 
FEE literature in sticking to generalities—and low-grade generalities at that—
fell  between  two  stools  and  has  therefore  lost  influence  both  among  the 
intellectuals and among the “mass base.” 
Leonard Read, observing this process of flight from FEE of its capable 
members, has rationalized the process as one of “training” libertarians and 
then sending them off to better things, thus functioning as a “high school” of 
liberty. He thus ignores the fact that it could have been a lot more. But a 
“high school” it still is, and probably its most useful functions now are to 
influence  and  attract  beginners  in  liberty—especially,  indeed,  high  school 
students—and to still act as a gateway into the libertarian movement. But it is 
a gateway only and not in any sense a libertarian center any longer; so the 
question still remains: gateway to what? 
I need not dwell here on the overriding importance of the intellectuals 
and  scholars  in  forming  a  libertarian  cadre.  For  the  filiation  of  ideas  and 
influence works as a pyramid, from the highest-level intellectuals to lower 
levels, from graduate school to college, from treatise authors to journalists, 
on down to the housewife and man in the street. In this pyramid, one scholar 
is worth a thousand housewives, in the matter of influence, import, etc. (For 
more  on  the  importance  of  intellectual  filiation  and  influence,  cf.  the 
memorandum, “Suggestions for a General Research Program for the Volker 
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Even Claude Robinson has recognized that the trouble with the “right 
wing”  is  that  it  has  willingly  financed  a  great  deal  of  mass-influence 
propaganda directed to the average voter, while neglecting its scholars; the 
result has been, inevitably, not only a failure of scholarship to grow, but a 
lack of influence on the average voters themselves. No group, for example, 
acted with more energy on the mass base directly than the old Committee for 
Constitutional Government, and with no results whatever. 
Another  danger  which  the  history  of  FEE  and  other  right-wing 
organizations tells us: the tendency for the fellow who can obtain money to 
be in control of policy, and the corollary tendency to begin to trim the output 
of the organization to what will attract the money. When the latter happens, 
the gathering of money begins to become the end, not the means, and the 
organization begins to take on the dimension of a “racket.” 
Phase III: The Emergence of the Volker Fund Concept 
A new and vital turning point in the postwar libertarian movement was 
the emergence of the Volker Fund program. Originated by Harold Luhnow, 
of the Volker Fund, it was brought to fruition by Herbert Cornuelle, and 
successors Richard Cornuelle and Ken Templeton. William Volker himself 
had  always  stressed  the  importance  of  grants  to  individuals,  rather  than 
organizations. The Volker Fund concept was to find and grant research funds 
to hosts of libertarian and right-wing scholars and to draw these scholars 
together via seminars, conferences, etc. Funds would be granted for projects 
that would advance libertarian thought; seminars would draw together right-
wingers and permeate them with libertarian ideas.  
In  this  new  phase,  with  its  crucial  emphasis  on  scholarship  and 
research, the Volker Fund has succeeded remarkably well. Libertarians have 
been  found  and  nurtured,  and  libertarian  allies  in  specific  fields  (e.g., 
recreation, water supply, and a host of others) arrayed together in informal 
“popular  front”  activity.  Indeed,  the  whole  Volker  Fund  activity  may  be 
considered a vast, informal, scholarly “popular front” operation. In addition, 
it  has  created  successful  formal  “fronts,”  such  as  the  Council  for  Basic 
Education  or  the  National  Book  Foundation,  for  specific  activity  along 
specific lines.  
On the other hand, the Earhart Foundation program, structured along 
similar lines, has been less successful, primarily because the Volker grantees 
have been those whose preponderant impact has been libertarian, taking their 
major fields into consideration, whereas Earhart grantees have been virtually 
everyone to the right of Walter Reuther, and the Earhart Foundation has thus 
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and  liquidationist  direction.  Thus,  when  Earhart  sponsored  A.F.  Burns’s 
series of lectures at Fordham some years ago, the net effect of this was to 
grant funds for A.F. Burns to shift his business leaders further to the left than 
they already were: a particularly disastrous example of the poor strategy of 
embracing almost everyone who is not an out-and-out socialist. 
In addition to individual grants and seminars and symposia, the Volker 
Fund has also done excellent work in sponsoring such influential graduate 
school professors as Mises at NYU and Hayek at Chicago, and awarding 
fellowships for study with these men. Here, too, is an approach toward a 
policy  of  nurturing  a  hard  core.  (As  an  example,  by  the  way,  of  the 
importance  of  individual  scholars  and  their  influence,  virtually  every 
libertarian or even economist in the country has been a student of either 
Ludwig von Mises, Frank Knight, or F.A. Harper.) 
Current Problems 
The FEE has been in existence for fifteen years; the new Volker Fund 
program  for  over  ten  years.  Not  only  does  this  length  of  time  make  a 
reassessment  necessary,  but  other  problems  have  emerged  that  make  the 
present time an important crossroads. First, the building up of the “popular 
front” Volker list has reached its maximum impact. Summer seminars and 
conferences have begun, inevitably, to repeat their members; and the bulk of 
the members there have been “libertarian” in only the vaguest manner.  
In short, the Volker Fund list consists largely of individual scholars 
who are vaguely sympathetic with libertarian or “conservative” aims, with 
others scattered through who more and more approach the hard core. There 
is little more that can be accomplished through widening the list; the time has 
come for a deepening of that list.  
With the popular front having reached its widest functioning extent, 
problems and gaps have increasingly emerged in the fund program. And the 
biggest of these gaps is the failure to build up a hard core. I mentioned before 
about  Ken  Templeton’s  theory  of  “infiltration”  that  for  successful 
infiltration, there must be a strong hard core which functions as a nucleus, a 
center from which the infiltration emanates. There is not, and has not been, 
such a hard core. Without a strong hardcore center, the “infiltration” process 
inevitably leads not to the “revolutionary” goal of exerting leverage on less-
advanced persons, not to drawing new members into the hard core, but to the 
weakening and dissolving of the hard core itself.  
The failure to nurture a strong core means that those who are inclined 
to be hardcore libertarians, as they work and act constantly “in the field” with 
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Acting in the world, acting “practically,” then, is all very well, but doing so 
without a strong hardcore nucleus means the eventual loss of principle, it 
means a surrender to liquidationism and “opportunism.” This is bound to 
happen  when  the  hard  core  is  not  nurtured  and  made  strong,  and  it  has 
happened increasingly over recent years. It happens when a William Peterson 
begins to shape farm programs for a Dick Nixon, or prattles about “balance” 
in the “public sector”; it happens when a Richard C. Cornuelle insists on 
acting  “positively,”  on  cracking  down  on  “negative  thinking”  about  the 
government,  on  hopelessly  trying  to  compete  with  the  government  in 
financing the ends that the Left decides to set for society. (Who can more 
abundantly and amply finance a Left-set goal such as a “college education for 
every  man,”  or  “palaces  for  old  people”?  The  government,  or  a  private 
welfare outfit?) 
In  World  War  II,  as  I  said  before,  the  danger  and  despair  of  the 
individual  hardcore  libertarian  was  his  isolation.  Now,  in  1961,  with  the 
libertarian  and  right-wing  movements  seemingly  flourishing  and  growing 
apace, on scholarly and more popular levels, he is, once again, increasingly in 
danger of being isolated. Except this time, the danger is less apparent and 
more  insidious.  For  it  is  the  danger  of  the  hardcore  libertarian  being 
swamped by a growing mass of “conservative” and right-wing thinkers.  
Although libertarians, under first FEE and then Volker aegis, grew in 
number and influence, a reversal has begun to set in, a reversal caused by a 
confusion of everyone on the Right, a growing erasure of the important lines 
that separate the hardcore libertarian from the “conservative.” The result of 
exclusive emphasis on popular-front work, has meant that a buildup of the 
“Right” in general, has diluted the hard core, made the public, and the Right 
itself,  increasingly  unaware  of  the  crucial  differences  between  a  hardcore 
libertarian and a plain conservative. With FEE no longer taken seriously as a 
center,  and  with  Volker  not  having  provided  such  a  center,  the  hardcore 
libertarian movement—the essence and the glory of what the struggle is all 
about—is in danger of dying on the vine. 
Thus,  any  given  Volker  Fund  seminar  will  have  only  one  or  two 
hardcore men to a dozen “confused” conservatives. This is inevitable, given 
the numerical weakness of the hard core. But, if there is no hardcore center, 
no firm, well-nourished nucleus, the hardcore men will have little influence 
on the conservatives who heavily outnumber them; hardcore strength itself 
will be diluted and vanish; and the whole purpose will be lost. 
Furthermore, the Volker Fund program of giving grants to professors 
where they are begins to suffer from precisely the same set of problems. This, 
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University of Keokuk will remain, forever, one libertarian professor at the 
University of Keokuk. Being isolated at his university, he will have little or no 
influence.  Outnumbered  by  the  faculty  colleagues,  he  will  be  held  up  to 
ridicule by faculty and students alike as an isolated “crackpot.” He will, then, 
generate no influence, as he will be isolated and cut off from productive 
interchange with fellow hardcore men (especially since those he may meet at 
summer  seminars  will  be  generally  much  less  clearly  libertarian  than  he 
himself), and he will therefore eventually lose his libertarian drive, if not his 
libertarian principles themselves. 
The  increasing  danger  of  the  “swamping”  of  the  libertarian 
intellectual—which itself is inherent when the hard core is not nourished, 
fostered, and brought together as a nucleus—has been enormously redoubled 
by the transformation that has been effected in the right wing itself. This 
transformation, lead by the theoreticians of National Review, has transformed 
the Right from a movement which, at least roughly, believed first of all in 
individual liberty (and its corollaries: civil liberties domestically, and peace and 
“isolation”  in  foreign  affairs)  into  a  movement  which,  on  the  whole,  is 
opposed  to  individual  liberty—which,  in  fact,  glorifies  total  war  and  the 
suppression of civil liberty, as well as monarchy, imperialism, polite racism, 
and a unity of Church and State.  
The Right having increasingly taken on this tone and complexion, it is 
all the more vital for the libertarian movement to be dissociated from, rather 
than allied with, the bulk of the right wing. The chief trouble now with the 
theory of the “popular front” is that this “front” has been largely infected 
with  enemies  of,  rather  than  friends  of,  liberty.  Fortunately,  the  Volker 
Fund’s  own  program  suffers  much  less  than  others  (Earhart,  Richardson, 
etc.)  from  this  problem,  because  the  fund’s  concentration  has  been  on 
economists, who, in their capacity as economists (Chicago School, etc.) have 
been, at least on net balance, proponents of liberty. But in any other field but 
economics, the danger is grave indeed. 
The present parlous state of the “right wing” makes imperative, in my 
view,  a  negative  approach  to  any  fund  involvement  with  “direct  action” 
organizations  of  the  Right:  this  means  not  only  such  directly  political 
organizations  as  the  Young  Americans  for  Freedom  but  also  such 
organizations  as  the  Intercollegiate  Society  of  Individualists,  which  has, 
increasingly, been playing hand-in-glove with the right-wing drive for war and 
“anti-Communism.” And even though there is opportunity for a philosophic 
synthesis, in some respects, between libertarians and conservatives (e.g., the 
addition to libertarianism of natural law, moral principles, etc.) there is no real 
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(Even philosophically, conservatism has so many things wrong with it 
that an attempt at synthesis distorts the real nature of conservatism: as it must 
overlook the conservatives’ hostility to personal liberty, drive toward war, 
reverence for a theocratic state so long as it be “traditional,” support for 
colonial imperialism, opposition to reason, etc. And here I want to go on 
record as regretting my own recent article in Modern Age, as distorting the 
nature  of  conservatism  by  dwelling  almost  exclusively  on  its  favorable 
features.)  
Needless  to  say,  any  support  for  such  organs  as  National  Review  is 
contraindicated, and this extends even to the much better organ, Modern Age. 
I have come to the conclusion that, for libertarian thought to survive, a sharp 
break with “conservatism” must be undertaken, and even the new, improved 
Modern Age is too riddled with conservatism to be satisfactory. The time is too 
late for such a popular front. 
I  think  it  important  to  state  what  I  am  not  advocating.  I  am  most 
certainly not advocating that the Volker Fund drop its great program of aid 
to individual scholars. This superb conception needs to be continued and 
expanded. But there needs to be, in addition, much greater concentration on 
nourishing a hardcore libertarian center. I am sorry to say that at this point, I 
have no concrete panacea to offer. What form this nourishment should take is 
still unclear. I believe that a scholarly libertarian institute, on the postgraduate 
level, a counterpart to the Institute for Advanced Study, would be the ideal 
solution. The idea would be to gather together leading libertarian scholars, to 
have permanent and also temporary staffs (the latter via fellowships), etc. 
This  would  not  be  degree  granting,  and  thus  would  avoid  the  enormous 
pitfalls faced by any graduate school operation such as Sennholz’s “American 
School of Economics.”  
Failing  the  considerable  amount  of  funds  required  for  such  an 
Advanced Study institute, there are other partial steps that could be taken 
which could eventually lead into an institute. One libertarian has suggested a 
counterpart of the Social Science Research Council, which would channel 
grants, create seminars, perhaps some day found an institute or society of 
alumni  fellows,  etc.  Another  suggestion  is  to  have  a  sort  of  libertarian 
counterpart of the Mont Pelerin Society, with annual papers read, a scholarly 
journal, etc. Certainly, one modest step would be to expand the number of 
Volker Fund–supported professors, with fellowships to students, as is now 
being done in the case of Mises and Hayek. 
This would not, of course, provide much of a libertarian center, but it 
would  at  least  stimulate  fellowships  for  studying  under  good  people.  The 
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school, with the result that his students are almost all low level, and when 
they graduate they do not teach or do research and thus do not have the 
“leverage effect” which is the main purpose of furthering intellectual work. It 
is  important  to  have  programs  established  in  the  liberal  arts  departments 
rather  than  in  schools  of  business,  which  are  looked  down  upon  by  the 
intellectual  world  anyway  and  often  with  good  reason.  (2)  Hayek’s  Social 
Thought  program  is  in  an  “offbeat”  department  which,  rather  than 
integrating all humane disciplines, teaches very little and makes almost no 
demands  on  the  students;  further,  the  result  of  this  is  that  a  Ph.D.  from 
Social Thought carries little or no academic weight. 
I am sorry that I have no further concrete suggestions to offer. My 
thesis can be summed up as saying that in this crossroads in the history of 
libertarian  movement  it  is  vital  to  de-emphasize  drastically  popular  fronts 
with  the  conservative  “Right,”  to  nourish  and  construct  the  hardcore 
libertarian movement with some form or forms of nucleus or center, and to 
emphasize libertarian scholars and intellectuals primarily, and, if more direct 
action  is  desired,  libertarian  publicists  and  workers  exclusively.  The  big 
danger to the libertarian movement now is a swamping by a rapidly growing 
(on intellectual and “practical” levels) conservative movement that presents 
more of a threat to liberty than a support. The great task facing us is the 
rescue of the libertarian movement from this danger. 